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RIGHTS OF CREDITORS UNDER A TESTAMENTARY
GENERAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT
Wyeth v.Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore'
B executed a deed of trust of all her property to the
Defendant as trustee, directing that the income be paid
to her for life and that on her death the residue should
go "for such uses as I may by last will and testament appoint." When B died she was indebted to the Plaintiff
for more than $9,000. The corpus of the trust fund was
in excess of $15,000, but apart from this her individual
estate was less than $3,000 and therefore insufficient to
pay her debt to the Plaintiff. In her will B specified that
it was her intention to exercise therein the power of appointment and one of the succeeding provisions was that
her debt to the Plaintiff should be paid with interest.
The Court of Appeals called the power a general power
and held that it had been validly exercised for the purpose of paying the debt due the Plaintiff as well as carrying out the other provisions of the will. But the Court
in words implied that if the power had been exercised on
behalf of appointees other than creditors, the creditors
would not have been allowed to reach the property to
satisfy their claims.
Major problems suggested by this case may be stated
as follows:
(1) What form of words will create a general power
in Maryland: 2
(a) If the donor and donee are the same person?
(b) If the donor and donee are different persons?
1

4 A. (2d) 753 (Md. 1939).
' The words "general power" are used in this article in their strict
sense as denoting a power which the donee is authorized to exercise
in favor of any person, including his own creditors. A general power
is defined as one which may be exercised in favor of any person whomsoever and thus by the very terms of its definition it may be exercised
in favor of a creditor. SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) Sec.
246; 49 C. J. 1250, Powers, Sec. 6; Gump, The Meaning of "General"
Powers of Appointment Under The Federal Estate Tam (1937) 1 Md. L.
Rev. 300; Leser v. Burnett, 46 Fed. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931), cited
and impliedly approved in Morgan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 60 S. Ct. 424 (U. S. 1940) ; Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879);
Johnson v. Cusbing, 15 N. H. 298 (1844); U. S. v. Field, 255 U. S. 257,
41 S. Ct. 256, 65 L. Ed. 617, 18 A. L. R. 1461 (1921).
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(2) Assuming that a general power has been created
and exercised on behalf of appointees other than creditors, will the creditors of the donee be enabled to satisfy
their claims from the property subject to the power, in
the event the remaining estate is insufficient?
The terminology used to create the power of appointment in the Wyeth case would be regarded in most jurisdictions as sufficient to create a general power under which
the donee could appoint to his creditors.3 Also, the effect
of such a power outside of Maryland would be that creditors would have a right to reach the property to satisfy4
their claims in the event it were appointed to a volunteer.
Both of the last statements would be true regardless of
whether the donee of such power of appointment were
the same person as the donor.
In Maryland, however, prior to the Wyeth case, it had
been considered as the law that a power of appointment
created by such language could not be exercised by the
donee in favor of his creditors and that the property subject to it could not be reached by them. This conception
resulted from a broad interpretation of the earlier case
of Balls v. Dampman.5 In the Dampman case, the facts
were similar to this case except that the donee of the power
was not the donor. The language creating the power was
"to will and dispose of the same in such manner as she
may see fit by any instrument in the nature of a last will
and testament." The Court there said that the donee
"had . .. only the power to appoint, that is, to name by
This has never been questioned generally. It has been accepted as
a natural consequence of such words and assumed as a basis for reasoning in the cases which allow the creditors to reach the property
when appointed to a volunteer. See cases supra n. 2.
4 Supra n. 2.
See also Freeman's Adm'r v. Butter, 94 Va. 406, 26 S. E.
845 (1897) ; Smith v. Garey, 22 N. C. 40 (1838) ; Patterson v. Lawrence,
83 Ga. 703, 10 S. E. 355 (1880).
r69 Md. 390, 16 A. 16, 1 L. R. A. 545 (1888).
While the doctrines
discussed in this note may be contained in statements made in other
Maryland cases from time to time, this note confines itself to a discussion of those cases in which the wording of the power involved
was sufficiently broad to have been construed elsewhere as a general
power (see supra n. 2). It is submitted that other cases are not directly
relevant because on their facts the powers involved were "limited" or
"special" under generally accepted doctrines (see, for example, Price
v. Cherbonnier, 103 Md. 107, 63 A. 209 (1906)); or, because they were
decided on grounds which made their statements with reference to the
doctrines herein discussed of little real weight (see Albert, et al, v.
Albert, et al., 68 Md. 352, 12 A. 11 (1888); Myers v. Safe Deposit & Tr.
Co., 73 Md. 413, 414, 21 A. 58, 59 (1891); Prince De Bearn v. Winans,
111 Md. 434, 74 A. 626 (1909) ; Trust Co. v. Bergdorff etc., Co., 167 Md.
158, 173 A. 31, 93 A. L. R. 1205 (1934)).
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will, the person or persons to whom the property should
go; and she had no authority to devise it for the payment
of her debts, that is, to encumber or consume it altogether,
for her own use. The construction insisted upon would,
if adopted, practically convert her from a mere life tenant
into an owner of the fee."
In the instant case the court distinguished the Dampman case by pointing out that there the donor and donee
were different persons while here they were the same.
Therefore the Court said in the Wyeth case that there was
no question of frustrating the intent of the donor, "the
intent of one is of necessity the intent of the other."
In Leser v. Burnett,6 the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted the Dampman case as holding that a limited rather than general
power existed and that some extraordinary terminology
was necessary to create a general power in Maryland. The facts in the Leser case were of the same character as in the Dampman case and the question before the
Court was whether or not the property which had been
appointed to relatives should be included in the gross estate of the donee for purposes of applying the Federal Estate Tax, which by statute was to be applied to all property passing under a general power of appointment. The
Court said that the Revenue Act covered general but not
special powers and, in discussing the difference between
the two, stated that in neither case did the donee have an
estate in the property. Rather it was said that in the case
of a general power the donee had a right to exercise the
same in favor of his creditors whereas in the case of the
special power he did not have such right, and it was this
right which made the property subject to the tax. It was
further held that to determine if this was a general power
the Court would look to the law of Maryland, where it
was well settled that the donee under the language used
does not have the right to appoint his creditors (citing the
Dampman case). The Court said that a general power
could doubtless be created in Maryland by- expressing in
the language creating it what would be implied in most
jurisdictions-i. e. that the donee might exercise the power
in favor of his creditors-but unless this were expressed
the power under Maryland law would not be general but
646 Fed. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931), cited and impliedly approved
in Morgan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 60 S. Ct. 424 (1940).
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limited and being7 limited it would not be taxable under
the Revenue Act.
The Wyeth case may be regarded as the first instance
where the Court has found a general power of appointment to exist in the sense that the donee was permitted
to appoint to anyone, including his creditors s As a result the Maryland law may now be expressed as holding
that a true general power of appointment may be created
without any special language being required if the donor
and donee are the same person; but, if they are different
persons, special language is required under the doctrine
of the Dampman case.
The question next arises as to the effect of the Wyeth
case on the broader problem involved where a general
power exists under which creditors may be appointed but
the donee instead exercises the power in his will in favor
of others. May the creditors reach the property in equity
and subject it to their claims if the ordinary assets of the
donee's estate be insufficient? The determination of this
question was not necessary to the decision in the instant
case for the Court was only concerned with the eligibility
of the creditors as appointees. However, the Court said:
"Apart from the distinctions above mentioned, it
must be recognized that the position of creditors holding claims against the estate of one who has the power
to appoint under a deed of trust, but fails to exercise
it in their favor, is vastly different from that of creditors and other persons who are appointed by the donee,
for while they take under the deed, this is because
the power of appointment having once been exercised
is read into that instrument." 9
The property in the Wyeth case would undoubtedly be subject to
the Federal Estate Tax for the court expressly stated that a general
power existed and the donee was given the right to appoint to his creditors, thus meeting all the requirements laid down by the Leser case.
See Morgan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 60 S. Ct. 424 (U. S.

1940).

8 There have been instances where the Maryland courts have referred
to the existence of a general power in the sense that the creating instrument did not specify any particular persons to whom the property
could or could not be appointed but in those cases the rights of creditors were not considered. It is to be presumed that the courts did not
intend to change the law relating to creditors as set forth in the Dampman case and therefore such reference is questionable in view of the
strict definition of a general power. See supra n. 2; Preston v. Willett,
105 Md. 388, 66 A. 257 (1907) ; Merwin v. Carroll, 171 Md. 346, 188 A.
803 (1937).
1 The Court referring at this point to Pope v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 163
Md. 239, 161 A. 404 (1932).
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This language implies that, although a creditor may
be appointed under a general power (in the sense of a
power exercisable in favor of creditors), if in fact he is
not appointed he has no rights in the property and the
courts will not aid him in reaching the property to satisfy his claim against the donee. Such a construction of
this language would accord with an earlier similar assumption of the Court of Appeals in the Dampman case 0
although that case was not used to support the above quotation. Such construction is likewise supported by an examination of Pope v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co." which
was cited as authority for the above quotation. In the
Pope case the Court said that the exercise of a power relates back to the instrument creating it, that the donee has
no estate in the property subject to the power and that
the property could not be made subject to the claims of
his creditors. In the Pope case the question of creditors'
rights was not before the Court and therefore the statement of the rule preventing creditors from reaching the
property was dictum. But, it may be important dictum
because the Pope case was also a case where the donor
and donee were the same person. Therefore, in the light
of the instant decision, the Pope case involved a general
power of appointment which the donee could have exercised in favor of his creditors. Consequently, it might
be argued that the Court in the Wyeth case wished to point
out that it was not overruling the dictum in the Pope case
but was distinguishing it as being applicable only to creditors who were not appointed and were seeking to reach
the property.
The rationale of this dictum is undoubtedly the "doctrine of relation back,' 2 according to which the appointee
is considered to take title directly from the donor, and
the donee is deemed to be merely a conduit through whom
the transfer is effected. Future courts may consider this
doctrine as a bar to recovery by the creditor, reasoning
that the donee's contacts with the property are not sufficient to subject it to claims against his estate.
10It should be observed that in the Dampman case, the inability of
creditors to reach the property subject to the power in the absence of
appointment to them was assumed (as if conceded by counsel) rather
than discussed and settled (see the Dampman case, 69 Md. 390, 394, where
the Court said: "Now, if these words had not been written in the will
of Mrs. Balls, it is not pretended, on the part of the appellant, that he
could reach this property for the payment of the note in question").
"163 Md. 239, 161 A. 404 (1932).
12 SIES, op. cit. supra n. 2, Sec. 253.
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On the other hand in spite of the language in the three
cases" indicating that the Court would not allow a creditor to reach property which passed under a general power
of appointment, the way is still open to reach the opposite result if the issue should be directly presented for
determination. First, it could be argued that the Court
in the instant case did not directly approve the Pope case
but merely referred to it to distinguish between creditors
who are appointed by the donee and creditors whom the
donee fails to appoint, with the inference that they were
leaving that question for future solution. Secondly, it
could be reasoned that although in the Pope case the
power of appointment was similar to that involved in the
instant case, at the time the Pope case was decided, it
was felt that there could be no general power in Maryland under which creditors could be appointed unless express authority for doing so was granted. Therefore it
might be suggested that the statement was made in the
Pope case in contemplation of the power as being a limited one under which a creditor could not have been appointed in the first place; and that, had the Court viewed
it as being a true general power, different language would
have been used.
Allowing the creditors to succeed in reaching the property although it is not appointed to them would be but
an adoption of the rule which has long been the majority
view elsewhere. 4 The rationale of such position is that,
because he can appoint the property to anyone whomsoever, the donee has substantially the same dominion over
the property that a true owner would have, at least a sufficient interest for creditors to reach.
Primarily, the effect of the Wyeth case is to establish
the rule that a testamentary general power of appointment-under which a creditor of the donee may be appointed-may be created in Maryland if the donor and
donee are the same person, without any special language
being required. But, to create such a power if donor and
donee of the power are different persons, express authority must be given in the creating instrument for creditors
to be appointed unless the doctrine of the Dampman case
is to be modified in the future.
See the caveat to n. 5 8upra. It Is equally applicable here.
14 SIMES, op. cit. supra n. 2, See. 246; Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200
(1879); Johnson v. Cushing, 15 N. H. 298 (1844) ; Leser v. Burnett, 46
Fed. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); U. S. v. Field, 255 U. S. 257, 41 S.
Ct. 256, 65 L. Ed. 617, 18 A. L. R. 1461 (1921).
1"
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Secondly, the implication of the case is that even though
a general power of appointment exists which the donee
could exercise in his will in favor of his creditors, if instead, he appoints the property to volunteers, his creditors
will not be allowed to reach the property in satisfaction of
their claims. However, since this latter point has never
been presented to the Court where it recognized and acknowledged that it was dealing with such a general power,
there is a possibility that the Court will in the future
overrule its earlier statements on the matter and follow
the majority view holding in favor of the creditors.
A quaere might be raised as to whether the Court ultimately might not repudiate the Dampman case and recognize the possibility of a general power under language
such as used in the Wyeth and Dampman cases regardless
of whether donor and donee are the same person, and thus
be completely in accord with authority elsewhere. This
should depend on whether there is a real distinction in the
policy behind the interpretation of such powers according to identity of donor and donee.
APPEALS BY THE STATE IN CRIMINAL CASES
State v. Mariana'
Defendant-appellee was indicted on charges of illegal
betting and selling books and pools on races. On the
day of the trial, but before the trial began, he moved the
Criminal Court that the papers obtained by a search of2
his house in violation, as he alleged, of the Bouse Act
be suppressed as evidence and their use at the trial prohibited. Over the objection of the State, the motion was
received and granted, and, in the subsequent trial, the
State being without evidence, the defendant was acquitted.
The State appealed on the ground that the defendant's
motion should not have been received and ruled on before trial. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and
awarded a new trial, pointing out that they had previously decided, in Sugarman v. State,' that the practice of
'174 Md. 85, 197 A. 620 (1938).
Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 35. Sec. 4A, which is the Maryland statute rendering inadmissible, in misdemeanor cases, any evidence obtained
by illegal search and seizure, in violation of the Declaration of Rights,
or the use of which would amount to self-incrimination.
The practice of moving before trial
a 173 Md. 52, 195 A. 324 (1937).
to suppress and to obtain the return of evidence obtained by unconstitutional search and seizure does prevail in the Federal courts under the
I
Federal version of the rule against the use of such evidence.

